PROFESSOR GREENAWALT'S UNFASHIONABLE IDEA
H. Jefferson Powell*
To understand why Kent Greenawalt is a legal scholar of the first
order, we need to grasp just how completely indifferent he has been to
the intellectual fashions of the day. The man is a closet radical. Beneath a
personal congeniality and a generous courtesy to the work of others that
are all too unusual in the contemporary legal academy, Professor
Greenawalt has shown no respect for assumptions that most of us, in the
academy and elsewhere, accept at so deep a level that we seldom need to
state or to discuss them. Scholarly contumacy is what I call it, and it is
high time Greenawalt is unmasked for the revolutionary he truly is. In
order to do so effectively, however, we need first to review what we all
know but seldom talk about.
I.
Ever since the Enlightenment, for many intellectuals, religion has
seemed peculiarly resistant to thought. It makes factual assertions that
are ungrounded, moral demands that are nonnegotiable, social claims
that are at one and the same time impossibly parochial and terrifyingly
imperialistic. From this perspective, religion is a, or even the, great antagonist of the cool, dispassionate, universal Reason that is and was the great
Enlightenment ideal. The perception that eighteenth-century rationalism was at war with fundamentally irrational religious commitments was
itself already a common idea in the era of the philosophes. In August
1739, the distinguished English philosopher Joseph Butler rebuked the
famous evangelistJohn Wesley: "Sir, the pretending to extraordinary revelations and gifts of the Holy Ghost is a horrid thing, a very horrid
thing."' To be sure, Butler was himself a devout Christian (in fact, a
bishop of the Church of England), and his objection to Wesley's preaching stemmed, in part, from intramural Anglican disagreements over
church order.2 But as Butler's overheated language suggested, underneath Butler's starchy concern for episcopal authority lay his horrified
fear that Wesley and those like him were simply providing evidence for
* Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. Immense, Unfathomed, Unconfined 258 (Sean Winter ed., 2013). Butler did
important work in ethics and the philosophy of mind and identity; his Analogy of Religion,
Natural and Revealed was an influential defense of the rationality of orthodox Christianity.
On Butler's continuing relevance in moral philosophy, see, e.g., Tom Regan, Moore's Use
of Butler's Maxim, 16J. Value Inquiry 153, 159 (1982) (discussing Butler's influence in
twentieth century moral philosophy).
2. Wesley was not the anirational religious zealot Butler feared, and Butler was not
the vaguely Deistic ecclesiastical politician eighteenth-century English bishops are sometimes thought to have been.

20151

A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT

the assertion that religion is, in the end, an irrational phenomenon: One
can make sense of religion (in terms of history or politics or superstition
or what we now would call anthropology or psychology), but one cannot
make sense with or in religion. Religious claims, on this view, simply can't
be fit into rational discourse.
In a strangely parallel fashion, for many intellectuals-at least in
American law schools-the law itself has come to seem similarly resistant
to thought in the wake of what I suppose we must call postmodernism.
This is a highly significant (if vastly understudied) development in recent
American intellectual history. In early modernity, common lawyers
understood the art and science of which they were masters to be a species
of rational inquiry so clearly intertwined that law and reason could hardly
be distinguished: As Lord Coke famously claimed, "[r] eason is the life of
the law; nay, the common law itselfe is nothing else but reason."3 In many
types of social controversy, to put the matter a little less exuberantly, legal
analysis and argument are the tools of choice, on Coke's view, if we wish
to resolve a controversy through reason rather than brute force. Coke's
law, unlike the irrational religiosity Bishop Butler feared, is the ally and
servant of reason.
Lord Coke is dead, alas, and his successors, many of them, have
quietly disavowed their inheritance. Why they have done so is not always
clear. It has long been obvious that there are dangers inherent in Coke's
equation of law and reason. As Justice Holmes and many others have
pointed out, the "reason" of the law can ossify into a self-contained conceptual system of abstractions and generalizations that lose touch with
reality and in particular with the social goods that the legal system exists
to serve. 4 "We must think things not words," as Holmes put it, "or at least
we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they
stand, if we are to keep to the real and the true."5 Legal concepts should
social world
be means to the end of understanding the realities of the
6
and addressing its problems, not mystifications or blinders.
Holmes's intent was to criticize and thus correct a maldevelopment
in legal reasoning, not to jettison the ideal of law as reason altogether.7
3. Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England *97b (1628).
4. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 443, 460 (1899) (distinguishing teaching legal "dogma" from inquiry into "the real
justification of a rule of law [which] is that it helps to bring about a social end which we
desire").
5. Id.
6. Holmes's great line about the life of the law opposes "experience" (engagement
with social reality) to "logic" (disengaged conceptualism of the sort he equated with Dean
Langdell), not to the "reason" that the common lawyers at their best aspired to follow.
7. See, e.g., the peroration at the close of Holmes's Path of the Law, with its invocation of "the command of ideas" as the greatest ambition in the law: "It is through them
that you not only become a great master in your calling, but connect your subject with the
universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of
the universal law." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 478
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But just such a retreat from Coke's equation underlies much that has
happened in the legal academy and, what is equally to the point, in the
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, over the past few
decades. Many academics have come to think of traditional legal reasoning much the same way that an Enlightenment Deist thought of traditional religion, an anti-intellectual fraud to be seen through, not thought
with. Law, traditional legal thought, isn't reason-it's obfuscation. The
Justices, who don't have an academic's luxury of turning to other and
more fashionable intellectual pursuits, increasingly show signs that they
are giving up on many of the traditional tools of legal thought and decision-precedent, analogy, normative argument-and turning to other
8
means of executing their duty to reach reasonable decisions.
Nowhere have the effects been clearer from the slow erosion of
implicit confidence in the traditional tools of their own trade than in the
Justices' decisions involving the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment. This is hardly surprising. In the postEnlightenment world
of Supreme
Court jurisprudence,
the
Enlightenment difficulty with fitting the claims of religion into any
rational framework was always going to make decisions under the religion clauses difficult. For example, a quarter century ago, Michael
Sandel described the Court's religion clause jurisprudence as an attempt
to assimilate the idea of religious liberty into an ostensibly rational framework in which liberty is understood as protected by governmental neutrality toward individual preferences. As Sandel persuasively argued, religion is precisely not a matter of choice for (many) religious people, and
treating it as such "confuses the pursuit of preferences with the exercise
of duties" when dealing with "persons bound by [religious] duties they
have not chosen."9 If Sandel's overall analysis was correct, the Court's
modern religion clause case law got off on the wrong foot and needed a
significant course correction if it was to fulfill the constitutional premise
of religious freedom. Traditional legal reasoning allows for the possibility
of such missteps and provides avenues for correction, but in an age
where professors and Justices alike have lost confidence in the reason of
the law, one might suspect that the Court would find it well-nigh impossible to find the path of reason in dealing with religion.
And so it has proved. The law of the religion clauses, almost everyone agrees, is a mess. For almost forty years the Supreme Court ostensibly
enforced the Free Exercise Clause by applying the compelling interest
test-and a form of judicial scrutiny that in other contexts nearly always
proves fatal to the action under scrutiny proved (inexplicably) less strin(1897). Now is not the occasion to debate anyone inclined to dismiss Holmes's language as
a mere rhetorical flourish.
8. As yet the members of the Court haven't turned up any compelling alternatives,
in my judgment, but that too is a debate for another day.
9. Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in Articles of
Faith, Articles of Peace 91, 92 (1990).
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gent when religious free exercise was at stake. In 1990, the Court executed an abrupt, if rhetorical, about-face and reduced free exercise analysis to a form of discrete-and-insular minority review with very little practical significance.'" The Smith decision achieved doctrinal coherence (the
Court's rhetoric now matches the predictable results) at the expense of
draining the principle of free exercise of any independent significance;"'
in its inability even to comprehend "the special concern of religious
liberty with the claims of conscientiously encumbered selves," 2 the Smith
majority betrayed its underlying assumption that religious commitments
are inherently arational.13
The tale of modern Establishment Clause doctrine is more complicated but, in the end, no less depressing. In 1971, the Supreme Court
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman a three-party inquiry as a means of
analyzing Establishment Clause cases. 14 Lemon reflected the penchant of
its era for multifactor "tests" that promised more analytical clarity than
they could deliver, but subsequent decisions substituted palpable anarchy
for illusory precision. Without ever overruling or doing much in the way
of modifying the "Lemon test," the Court has vacillated-often without
even acknowledging the fact-among Lemon, variations based on the
different prongs of Lemon, and entirely distinct approaches to
Establishment Clause analysis, some of which are quite inconsistent with
Lemon. 5 In 1993, Justice Scalia observed that a majority of the then10. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (applying "compelling
state interest" test in First Amendment analysis), with Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-90 (1990) (deeming "compelling interest" inapplicable to
prohibition at issue and questioning its validity generally). The political branches reacted
to this judicial deletion of a constitutional provision by enacting a statute intended to
restore the compelling interest test, but a Court badly divided over Smith found common
ground in the proposition that Congress can't overrule the Court. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to
states). For a demonstration that the Act did no such thing in the constitutionally objectionable sense, see Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.),
vacated, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
11. Professor Greenawalt has written that "despite its protestations that it is faithful to
prior principles and will have little practical effect, [Smith] performs radical surgery on the
scope of free exercise claims." 1 Kent Greenwalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free
Exercise and Fairness 442 (2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness].
12. Sandel, supra note 9, at 91.
13. This assumption, particularly when it remains at the level of unquestioned assumption, is perfectly compatible with religious commitments on the part of those who hold it.
Not all religious people agree with Bishop Butler that reason and true religion are and
must be ultimately compatible.
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) ("Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
(internal citations omitted))
15. For a recent, and admirably sardonic, summary of the incoherence of the Court's
case law, along with its confusing effects on the lower courts, see Utah Highway Patrol
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sitting Justices had rejected Lemon's authority, but nevertheless, "[1] ike
some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence."1 6 A quarter-century later, a majority of the Court-perhaps by now amounting to a consensus of the Justices-continues to agree that Lemon is inadequate, but
the Court continues to invoke it as controlling-sometimes.17 Opinions
that invoke Lemon under these circumstances inevitably have the feel of
verbal compromises intended to paper over conflicting and inconsistent
views on how the Court should address Establishment Clause issues.18
One might try to excuse these inconsistencies by pointing to the fact that
the decisions of a multimember Court will inevitably reflect the differing
jurisprudential views of its members, but this explanation rests on the
assumption (a correct one, I think) that the Justices have lost faith in the
power of traditional legal reason to resolve difficult issues.1 Judges in the
law-is-reason tradition of Lord Coke-and Justice Holmes-would have
recognized an obligation to serve "the integrative and rationalizing
Assoc. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132S. Ct. 12, 14-20 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of cert.) ("Our jurisprudence provides no principled basis by which a lower court could
discern whether Lemon/endorsement, or some other test, should apply in Establishment
Clause cases... lower courts have understandably expressed confusion.").
16. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
17. See McCreary Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859-66
(2005) (applying Lemon's three-part test for determining secular purpose). On the same
day, and in a case involving the same basic question (does a governmental display of the
Ten Commandments violate the Establishment Clause?), the lead opinion concluded that
"[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument."
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (plurality opinion).
18. In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[m]any of our recent cases
simply have not applied the Lemon test [while] [o]thers have applied it only after concluding that the challenged practice was invalid under a different Establishment Clause
test." 545 U.S. at 686.
19. It is striking that the most methodologically self-conscious of the currentJustices
endorse approaches to the Establishment Clause that eschew traditional legal reasoning
altogether. Justice Thomas, for example, rejects any application-by-analogy of the
Establishment Clause to issues not within the original meaning of "establishment" as he
perceives that meaning, i.e., "'coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by
force of law and threat of penalty."' Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see
also Utah Highway PatrolAssoc., 132 S.Ct. at 16 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)
(criticizing "superficiality and irrationality of a jurisprudence meant to assess whether
government has made a law 'respecting an establishment of religion"). Justice Breyer is
similarly critical of "any set of formulaic tests" for resolving difficult Establishment Clause
cases, but for Thomas's positivist originalism, Breyer proposes to substitute a fact-andconsequences-driven judgment based on his "consideration of the basic purposes of
the... Religion Clauses" as he perceives those purposes. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702-04
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct.
1811, 1839-41 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing five "factors that I believe underlie the conclusion that, on the particular facts of this case... [hiaving applied my legal
judgment to the relevant facts").

2015]

A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT

functions of doctrinal analysis" rather than permitting Establishment
Clause doctrine to descend into chaos. 20 For postmodern judges who
have seen through the forms of the law, there is no such obligation, and
our postmodern Justices have accordingly gone on to other modes of
decision.
A subject for decision, religion, that is intrinsically beyond reason.
An empty language of decision, law, that ultimately masks reasoning
based on other considerations-history, empirical sociology, economics,
etc., as the decisionmaker finds most persuasive. Who would be so intellectually obstreperous as to suggest that we tackle conflicts involving religion by thinking about them within the internal rationality of the law?
The idea is positively medieval and quite contrary to the spirit of our age.
It would take a remarkably bold (not to mention rebellious) individual to
purundertake such a project. Enter Professor Greenawalt, who has been
21
suing, with marvelous success, exactly that project for many years.
II.
Kent Greenawalt has always taken a broad view of what legal scholarship can and often should involve. Even in his early work, the overlap between legal and moral concerns was an important theme. Early articles
addressed substantive themes such as civil disobedience, moral obligation
and the law, and specific issues such as the legal and ethical significance
of silence, while other pieces displayed his ability to write in jurisprudence and analytical philosophy.22 Eventually the big books in this vein
followed-legal and moral conflict, the idea of objectivity in law, and the
other work applied
value for law of interpretive theory 23-while
Greenawalt's philosophical and legal expertise to the difficult questions
raised by the Constitution's guaranty of freedom of expression. 24 Ordinary mortals would have viewed these endeavors as enough to fill a
couple of CVs,25 but if Greenawalt had stopped here, he might not have

20. Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 70 (1995).
21. As I acknowledge just below, religion and law is not the only subject in Professor
Greenawalt's extensive oeuvre.
22. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 Colum. L.
Rev. 48 (1970); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 982 (1978); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1167 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right,
23 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 15, 19 (1981).
23. Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality (1987); Kent Greenawalt, Law
and Objectivity (1992); Kent Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation: Perspectives from Other
Disciplines and Private Texts (2010).
24. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fighting Words (1995); Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime
and the Uses of Language (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 697 (1996).
25. I will not try to convict Professor Greenawalt of prolixity by citing any of his excellent work on criminal law topics unrelated to free speech.
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been able to show that he was other than tireless and extremely gifted.
Adding a long and illustrious series of articles, essays, and books on the
legal and political issues raised by religious commitment was not just a
natural extension of his other interests.26 Doing so enabled him to bring
out into the open his insouciant disregard for the common wisdom of
the era: Greenawalt, it seems, did not get the memo that law isn't reason
Instead, he went about provand religion can't be dealt with reasonably.
27
ing both convictions dead wrong.
Let us start with Professor Greenawalt's approach to religion. In
contrast to the high Court (as both Professor Sandel and I would read its
decisions), Greenawalt does not attempt to assimilate religious commitments to the model (ultimately economic) of individual personal preferences of a nonrational character. Greenawalt understands that for many
(probably most) people for whom religion is significant, their religious
commitments and convictions are not choices that they could have made
otherwise, and might decide to change tomorrow: The claims of religion
are instead obligations that encumber and define the self and that cannot be set aside without serious injury.28 That is not because he would
exclude from constitutional or political consideration those elements of
religious commitment or practice that do not meet some external,
rationalistic criterion of acceptability: Religion typically involves a mixture of rational and nonrational elements ... but then such a mixture is
characteristic of human thought and action more generally, whether or
not a given individual is religious. 29 The nonrational aspect of religious
26. As with other topics, I make no effort to list all the work. The articles are early
and late. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal. L.
Rev. 753 (1984); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 21 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 449 (2013). As for the books, see Kent Greenawalt, Does God
Belong in Public Schools? (2007); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public
Reasons (1995); 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and
Fairness (2008) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness]; Greenawalt, Free
Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Consciences and Political
Choice (1991).
27. I shall not attempt to trace developments in Professor Greenawalt's thought
about religion or law, not because his thinking has remained static, but because his work
for many years has displayed the admirable characteristics I discuss.
28. Greenawalt often acknowledges this important point, both in general and with
respect to specific issues. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 26,
at 139 (discussing why "[it] is not hard to see" certain Christians' objections to theory of
evolution); Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 439 (referring to
"widespread sense that one's religious obligations are more ultimate than those of the
social order"); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Public Reasons: Making Laws and
Evaluating Candidates, 27 J.L. & Pol. 387, 405 (2012) ("For many people, their religious
convictions and affiliation are an important part of who they are.").
29. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religiously Based Judgments and Discourse in
Political Life, 22 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 445, 460, 480 (2007) ("In much of what we
believe, rational understanding, however that is conceived, intertwines with other assumptions .... In making up their minds about [a difficult legal or moral issue] everybody will
rely to an extent on nonrational (I do not say irrational) intuitions.").
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commitment does not place it beyond the scope of reasoned discussion,
in part because everyone draws on such nonrational sources of belief and
action.
At the same time, Greenawalt refuses to convert "religion" into a
synonym for whatever are a person's deepest moral convictions, an intellectual sleight of hand that makes all positions into "religious" ones and
thereby drains the religion clauses of independent significance.30 The
result is that we can reason from a clear-headed understanding of the
nature of religious commitment to conclusions about its role in a diverse
and liberal society.
I think the sense of obligation to an entity beyond oneself that is
so important for most religious believers is a powerful enough
reason to warrant giving legal protection to some religious
claims of conscience that do not involve moral conclusions,
while protection is denied for nonreligious, nonmoral claims.
No reason comparable to the believer's sense of obligation to a
higher authority applies when a nonbeliever's sense of what the
nonbeliever should do is outside the realm of morality.3
In Professor Greenawalt's world, argument over how far the political
community can accommodate the distinctive needs of religious people
and about the extent to which it cannot do so does not take us outside
the realm of reasoned discussion.
What about reason and the law? The evidence is clear: Professor
Greenawalt is an unabashed reactionary, a true disciple of Lord Coke,
even if his erudition, his analytical sophistication, and his fair-minded
presentation of opposing arguments tend to disguise the fact. A few years
ago, Greenawalt conceded that his "own position about constitutional
interpretation [was] fairly labeled 'eclectic.' I believe a range of considerations are relevant besides original understanding, however that is conceived, and that no neat ordering or precise method of weighing can be
assigned. ' 32 But the adjective is misleading to the extent that it suggests
30. See, for example, Greenawalt's careful discussion of how far to extend the scope
of "religion," Greenawalt, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 129-56, and his
conclusion that
refus[ing] to conflate religion and conscience is not only the most sound in
terms of constitutional language, it also allows a nuanced evaluation of constitutional claims for equality. Concerns about equality that have led some scholars to
a very broad constitutional definition of religion can better be handled by more
discrete inquiries about equal treatment.
Id. at 156.
31. Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 901, 916
(2010).
32. Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1131, 1142 (2010) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions]; see also Kent Greenawalt, How Does "Equal
Liberty" Fare in Relation to Other Approaches to the Religion Clauses?, 85 Tex. L. Rev.
1217, 1218 (2007) (referring to "the more eclectic approach I support" in religion clause
analysis). In an early essay, Greenawalt identified a "moderate and eclectic" approach to
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that Greenawalt adopts an ad hoc, all-things-considered approach to the
analysis of religion clause issues. What Greenawalt means by the modest
word "eclectic" is that in addressing a constitutional question he employs
the full range of traditional legal tools," seeking the answer that makes
the best sense of the positive legal authorities that are relevant in light of
34
what he takes to be the fundamental purposes of the constitutional text.
Greenawalt, furthermore, has expressed his adherence to Coke's
high vision of law in the most dramatic academic fashion imaginable for
someone writing on constitutional issues. We live in an era in which elite
law professors tend to think of the doctrinal treatise as either impossible
(there is too little agreement to make a treatise intellectually cohesive) or
pedestrian (the law being essentially empty). 5 But after years of important work on the ethical, political, and social problems raised by religious
commitments in a liberal society, much of it more easily treated as moral
philosophy or political theory rather than law, Greenawalt's magnum
opus on the subject is a treatise on the constitutional law of the religion
clauses. In Greenawalt's hands, theories (his own as well as those of
others) have become the servant of his analysis of specific cases and
legal decisionmaking with Cardozo and the mainstream of American jurisprudential
thought. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that BindJudges, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 359 (1975).
33. As Greenawalt recently put it,
[a]mong the relevant considerations beyond the applicable constitutional text
[that he considers] are prior legal decisions and the principles they announce,
traditions within the country, contemporary values and understandings, the
implications of fundamental principles, and the desirability of standards that can
give relatively clear guidance to judges and to citizens.
Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions, supra note 32, at 1142-43. Unlike contemporary
constitutionalists who believe that the "correct" approach to constitutional questions
generates incontestably correct answers, Greenawalt recognizes that there is no algorithm
for decision. "Whether my conclusions are defensible or not, the basis for them is my
conviction that all the factors are relevant." Id.
34. Greenawalt has specifically rejected the criticism that his approach excludes the
consideration of normative and purposive considerations. See Greenawalt, Fundamental
Questions, supra note 32, at 1147 & n.32. See, for example, Professor Greenawalt's
persuasive analysis of the argument that the First Amendment requires a more absolute
priest-penitent privilege than may be constitutionally acceptable with respect to other
confidential disclosures, Free Exercise and Fairness, supra note 11, at 246-60, and his
sensitive discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of KiryasJoel v.
Grumet. 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (holding state violated Establishment Clause by creating
special school district defined geographically but designed to confer governmental power
on a religious community). See Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra 26, at 224236 (concluding decision was correct). I agree with him on the privilege issue and am not
persuaded by his, or the Justices', arguments about KiryasJoe4 one of the great pleasures of
reading Greenawalt's work is that his invariably fair-minded presentation of the issues and
arguments actually enables the unpersuaded reader to identify the source of his or her disagreement.
35. On the former rationale, see Professor Tribe's apologia for abandoning work on
the third edition of his treatise, Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d
291 (2005). The decline in prestige of the doctrinal treatise generally is a commonplace.
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issues that make up the law, and his goal of providing a rationale, in the
most persuasive manner possible, of the positive legal authorities.36 This
is work in the classical common law tradition: As Coke put it, "'[t]he
reporting of particular cases or examples.., is the most perspicuous
course of tracing the right rule and reason of the law' .. .. Law is practice, not a theoretical representation of it. ' 37 Rather than substituting
"theory" or "empirical research" for work within the law as a practice, as
so much "cutting-edge" scholarship seeks to do, Greenawalt has
embraced it, confident that legal thought provides an adequate tool for
bringing reason to bear on the political and social issues raised by
religion.
Only a bold scholar would dare to be so unfashionable, but
Professor Greenawalt's recent work doubles down on the commitment to
the law as reason underpinning his treatise on the religion clauses. I do
not have time to indicate how that same commitment is at work in his
important book on legal reasoning and statutory construction, 8 and I
have only had the chance to read in manuscript his fascinating, forthcoming general treatment of constitutional decisionmaking. But like
many others who have benefited from Greenawalt's wise counsel, I can
testify to another sense in which Greenawalt is unfashionably rooted in
legal tradition. The old common lawyers thought of themselves as exercising a form of "reasoning ... decisively shaped by the fact that it [was]
designed to be presented in a public forum in which the reasoning is
open to explicit challenge."39 Rather than relying on a system of authoritarian pronouncements based on incontestable premises, "the practitioner of this art of reasoning [was to] strive for common judgment in
the face of dispute and disagreement."' Legal thought, in other words,
was a common, shared activity, and the goal of argument was understanding and, where possible, agreement. No doubt this was an ideal
often honored in the breach. But for Kent Greenawalt, practitioner of
the arts of charitable interpretation and painstaking attention to the
work of others, the ideal is a reality that he embodies, in his work and in
his person.

36. See Greenawalt, Establishment and Fairness, supra note 26, at 543 (describing
"burden" of treatise as one of inquiring into "just how the religion clauses ... should best
be understood" by "[a]sking questions about that understanding, not in the abstract but
by focusing on concrete issues in context").
37. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford
Univ. Commonwealth L.J. 1, 6 (2003) (quoting volume 6 of Coke's Reports).
38. Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common Law Interpretation (2012).
39. Postema, supra note 37, at 8.
40. Id.

